Revealing anomalies to support error detection in softwareintensive systems is a promising approach when traditional detection mechanisms are considered inadequate or not applicable. The core of anomaly detection lies in the definition of the expected behavior of the observed system. Unfortunately, the behavior of complex and dynamic systems is particularly difficult to understand. To improve the accuracy of anomaly detection in such systems, in this paper we present a contextaware anomaly detection framework which acquires information on the running services to calibrate the anomaly detection. To cope with system dynamicity, our framework avoids instrumenting probes into the application layer of the observed system monitoring multiple underlying layers instead. Experimental evaluation shows that the detection accuracy is increased considerably through context-awareness and multiple layers monitoring. Results are compared to state-of-the-art anomaly detectors exercised in demanding more static contexts.
Introduction
Complex software-intensive systems include several different components, software layers and services. Often, these systems are characterized by a dynamic behavior related to changes in their services, connections or components themselves. In particular, Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) may aggregate proprietary as well as Off-The-Shelf (OTS) services, hiding their implementation details. It is a matter of fact that SOA dynamicity and information hiding obstacle monitoring solutions that directly observe the SOA services [19] . This collides with the increasing interest in using these systems for (safety) critical applications, and raises a call for adequate solutions to monitoring and error detection [1] , [21] .
Anomaly detection aims to find patterns in monitored data that do not conform to the expected behavior [1] . Such patterns are changes in the trends of indicators such as memory usage or network data exchange characterizing the behavior of the system caused by specific and non-random factors. As an example, anomalies can be due to a system overload, adversarial intrusion attempts, malware activity or manifestation of errors. Anomaly detection was proved [7] to be effective, highlighting anomalies and timely triggering reaction strategies to finally improve system safety or security.
Investigating dynamic contexts makes the definition of normal (and consequently anomalous) behavior a complex challenge: currently, there are no clear state-of-theart answers on applying anomaly detection in highly dynamic contexts. Focusing on SOAs, anomaly detection usually requires a reconfiguration step to define the nominal behavior when services are updated, added or removed from the SOA [1] . It follows that anomaly detectors may be reconfigured frequently, reducing their effectiveness and with a negative impact on the SOA execution.
In this paper we present an anomaly detection framework that aims to tackle the challenges above. We tune the monitoring system to observe the underlying layers (e.g., operating system, middleware and network) instead of directly instrumenting the services with monitoring probes. This allows detecting anomalies due to errors or failures that manifest in the services without directly observing them. Therefore, this multi-layer approach turned out very suitable to cope with SOA dynamicity, at the cost of a calibration time to reconfigure the parameters of the anomaly detector when changes of the SOA services are detected. This approach was previously proved effective on systems with reduced dynamicity respect to SOAs [14] , while experimental results showed that a more accurate definition of the context was needed in highly dynamic systems [6] to improve detection accuracy. In this study we consider knowledge of basic information on the context -referred as context-awareness -that can be easily retrieved from integration modules of SOAs. This knowledge helps defining more precisely the expected behavior of the dynamic target system, resulting in more accurate definition of anomalies and, consequently, a more effective anomaly detection process. In fact, our multi-layer monitoring structure makes available a wide set of indicators, and the most relevant ones for anomaly detection purposes are identified depending on the current context. Consequently they are observed, with corresponding monitoring probes, for anomaly detection.
Summarizing, our main findings are: i) describing how context-awareness on the SOA services can be used to improve detection; ii) defining a methodology and the associated framework for anomaly detection in dynamic contexts using contextawareness; iii) structuring a multi-layer anomaly detection module observing operating system, middleware (Java Virtual Machine, JVM) and network layers, iv) assessing the whole solution on a case study, showing the obtained detection accuracy, which is presented using well-known metrics and v) compare our detection system with state-of-the-art [2] , [3] , [14] solutions exercised in less dynamic contexts.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the use of contextawareness, which is at the basis of our work. Section 3 describes the resulting anomaly detection framework and the devised methodology. Section 4 presents the experimental evaluation. State of the art on related approaches and comparison are explored in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Learning from the past
This work stems from studies by the same authors [14] , [6] who devised multi-layer anomaly detection strategies to perform error detection using the Statistical Predictor and Safety Margin (SPS, [9] ) algorithm. SPS is able to detect anomalies without requiring offline training; this was proved to be very performing in less dynamic con-texts [14] , where the authors applied SPS to detect the activation of software faults in an Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. Observing only OS indicators, SPS allowed implementing an anomaly detector which performed error detection with high precision. Therefore we adapted this promising approach to work in a more dynamic context [6] , where we instantiated the multi-layer anomaly detection strategy on the prototype of the Secure! [8] SOA. The results achieved showed that analysing such a dynamic system without adequate knowledge on its behaviour reduces the efficiency of the whole solution. Despite the observed data stream was rapidly processed (below 200 ms for each input stream), we obtained a detection time -the time interval between the manifestation of the error and its detection -of 40 seconds with a high number of false positives and negatives.
We explain these outcomes as follows. SPS detects changes in a stream of observations identifying variations with respect to a predicted trend: when an observation does not comply with the predicted trend, an alert is raised. If the system has high dynamicity due to frequent changes or updates of the system components, or due to variations of user behaviour or workload, such trend may be very difficult to identify and thus predict. Consequently, our ability in identifying anomalies is affected because the boundaries between normal and anomalous behaviour cannot be defined with proper accuracy.
Considering context-awareness
We previously highlighted the need of acquiring more information on the target system, still maintaining the main benefits of the abovementioned approach. Consequently, we investigate which information on SOA services we can obtain in absence of details on the services internals and without requiring user context (i.e., user profile, user location). In SOAs, the different services share common information through an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB, [15] ) that is in charge of i) integrating and standardizing common functionalities, and ii) collecting data about the services. This means that static (e.g., services description available in Service Level Agreements -SLAs) or runtime (e.g., the time instant a service is requested or replies, or the expected resources usage) information can be retrieved using knowledge given by ESB. Consequently, having access to the ESB provides knowledge on the set of services running at any time t. We refer to this information as context-awareness of the considered SOA; note that we do not require information on the user context, contrary to what is typically done in the state-of-the-art on context-awareness [16] , [17] . We can exploit this information to define more precisely the boundaries between normal and anomalous behaviour of the SOA. For example, consider a user that invokes a store file service at time t. We can combine context-awareness with information on the usual behaviour of the service, which here regards data transfer. Therefore, if the store file service is invoked at time t, we expect the exchange of data during almost the entire execution of the service. If we observe no data exchange, we can reveal that something anomalous is happening.
2.2

Enhancing Detection Capabilities
We describe the technique we implemented to address the challenges of performing anomaly detection in dynamic systems underlined at the beginning of this section.
Collect services information. Let us start from the example of the store file service. Our objective is to characterize the normal behaviour the service, building a fingerprint of its usage. More in details, we need a description of the expected behaviour of the service, meaning that we need to describe the usual trend of the observed indicators (examples of indicators are in Table 2 and Table 3 ) while the service is invoked. In such a way, we can understand if the current observation complies or not with the expectations. This information can be retrieved in a SOA by observing the ESB and producing a new service fingerprint when the addition, update or removal of a service is detected. In several cases it is also possible to obtain a static characterization of the services looking at their SLA, where each service is defined from its owner or developer for the final user.
Integrate information in the anomaly detector. Summarizing, information about the services can be obtained i) statically, looking at SLAs, ii) at runtime, invoking services for testing purposes or iii) combining both approaches. In this paper we explore the second approach, discussing this choice in Section 3.2. This information needs to be aggregated and maintained (e.g., in a database) together with the calculated statistical indexes (e.g., mean, median), whenever applicable, to support the anomaly detection solutions.
Description of the Anomaly Detection Framework
Here follows the description of the resulting anomaly detection framework and the methodology to exercise it in a system.
Architectural overview
In Figure 1 we depict a high level view of the framework. Starting from the upper left part of the figure, the framework can be described as follows. The user executes a workload, which is a sequence of invocations of SOA services hosted on the Target Machine. In this machine probes are running, observing the indicators coming from 3 different system layers: i) OS, ii) middleware and iii) network. These probes collect data, providing a snapshot of the target system composed by the observation of indicators retrieved at a defined time instant. The probes forward the snapshot to the communication handler, which encapsulates and sends the snapshot to the communication handler of the Detector Machine. Data is analyzed on a separate machine, the Detector Machine (which includes a Complex Event Processor -CEP [18] ). This allows i) not being intrusive on the Target Machine, and ii) connecting more Target Machines to the same Detector Machine (obviously the number of Target Machines is limited by the computational resources of the Detector Machine). The communication handler of the Detector Machine collects and sends these data to the monitor aggrega-tor, which merges them with runtime information (e.g., list of service calls) obtained from the ESB. This allows storing context-awareness information in the database. Looking at runtime information, the monitor aggregator can detect changes in the SOA and notify the administrator that up-to-date services information is needed to appropriately tune the anomaly detector. The administrator is in charge of running tests (test invocation) to gather novel information on such services. The snapshots collected when SOA is opened to users are sent to the anomaly detection module, which can query the database for services information. The anomaly detection module analyzes each observed snapshot to detect anomalies. If an anomaly is detected, an alert is raised to the system administrator which takes countermeasures and applies reaction strategies. These are outside from the scope of this work and will not be elaborated further.
Methodology to exercise the framework
The framework is instantiated specifying i) the workload we expect will be exercised on the target system, ii) the way (static/runtime) in which the administrator prefers to obtain services information described in Section 2.2, iii) the monitored layers on the Target Machine and the number of probes per layer, and iv) the number of preliminary runs necessary to devise the detection strategy elaborated in Section 3.3. The methodology is composed of two phases: Training the Anomaly Detector and Runtime Execution.
Training the Anomaly Detector. This phase is organized in 3 steps. In the first step, services information characterizing the fingerprint of the investigated services can be obtained statically (e.g., from SLA) or at runtime (through the test invocation in Figure 1) . In our implementation, we chose this second option because it allows retrieving accurate information on the trend of the individual indicators; static information as SLA usually defines only general service characteristics and requirements. In the second step, once services information is collected, preliminary runs using the expected workload are executed, and the retrieved data are stored in the database. These data are complemented with data collected conducting error injection campaigns, where errors are injected in one of the SOA services, to witness the behavior of the Target Machine in such situations.
The service in which errors are injected may be a custom service devoted exclusively to testing, allowing to modify its source code. This strategy can result particularly useful when performing injections into the services that compose the target system is not feasible. For example, this happens when services source code is not available as in OTS services.
In the third step, services information and preliminary runs data are used by the anomaly detection module to tune its parameters, automatically choosing the configuration that maximizes detection efficiency for the current SOA (see Section 3.3).
We remark that we figured out two ways of obtaining the data in the first two steps: i) execute online tests before the user start working, or ii) copy the platform on another virtual machine and execute the tests on the spare machine in a controlled experimental environment. The first solution will force the user to wait until tests complete (see Figure 2 ), and consequently may reduce the availability of the SOA to the users. The second option requires additional resources to maintain and execute a copy of the Target Machine. In the rest of the paper we considered the first option: we collect context information through online tests before the SOA is opened to users. The induced delays on service delivery are measured in Section 4.1.
In some cases, to avoid downtime, it may be considered to postpone the execution of tests to low peak load periods such as at night. Obviously, delaying the execution of the tests (instead of running them immediately after services changes) implies that the anomaly detection module works with previous services information until the next training phase. This services information is now out of date: it is easy to note that this will negatively impact the accuracy of the anomaly detection module.
Runtime Execution.
Once the anomaly detector is trained, the system is opened to users. Monitor aggregator merges each snapshot observed by the probing system with runtime information, and it sends them to the anomaly detection module. This module Fig. 2 . Methodology: SOA hosted on target machine is available to users until a service update is detected from the runtime information. In that case, the training phase starts collecting services information and executing preliminary runs; the user needs to wait until it completes. Then the SOA is again available to users. provides a numeric anomaly score (see Section 3.3). If the score reaches a specified threshold alpha, an anomaly alert is risen and the administrator is notified. If during this phase a service update is detected, a new training phase is scheduled and it will be executed depending on the policies defined by the administrator (see Figure 2 ).
Insights on the Anomaly Detection Module
Periodically (e.g., once per second), the monitor aggregator provides to the anomaly detection module a snapshot of the observed system, composed of the quantities retrieved from the indicators. For each indicator, two quantities are sent: i) value: the current observation read by the probes, and ii) diff: the difference among the current value and the previous one. This allows building a set of anomaly checkers as follows. An anomaly checker is assigned to the value or to the diff quantity of an indicator, i.e., two anomaly checkers can be created for each indicators. Each anomaly checker decides if the selected quantity of the indicator is anomalous or normal following rules as described in the section below. The anomaly score for an observed snapshot is built combining the individual outcomes of the selected anomaly checkers; an anomaly is raised only if the alpha threshold is met.
Anomaly Checkers. For each indicator, we build three types of anomaly checkers:
 Historical: for a given indicator, this module compares the value or diff quantity with the expectations defined in services information. If this quantity is outside of the interval defined by average ± standard deviation in service information for that indicator, an anomaly is raised.  SPS: for a given data series (value, diff) of an indicator, this module applies an instance of the SPS algorithm described in [9] , [14] .  Remote call: this checker observes the response time and the HTTP response code for each service invocation. If the response code is not correct (e.g., HTTP Success 2xx) or if the response time is not in the range of the acceptability interval defined by services information, an alert is raised. For example, let us consider a set of 50 indicators. We obtain 201 possible anomaly checkers: 1 remote call checker and 200 anomaly checkers from the 50 indicators, organized in 4 anomaly checkers for each indicator (historical on value/diff data series, SPS on value/diff data series).
The set of checkers to be used is reduced during the training phase, analysing their scores for specified metrics (see below). As a result, the most performing checkers are selected for anomaly detection. This selection may happen i) choosing the n checkers with the highest score, or ii) considering checkers with a score greater than a threshold δ.
Specified Metrics. The anomaly checkers are evaluated during the training phase using measures based on indexes representing the correct detections -true positives (TP), true negatives (TN) -and the wrong ones i.e., missed detections (false negatives, FN) or false detections (false positives, FP). More complex measures based on the abovementioned ones are precision, recall and F-Score(β) [12] . Especially in the F-Score(β), varying the parameter β it becomes possible to weight the precision w.r.t the recall (note that F-Score(1) is referred as F-Measure). Considering that we are targeting safety-critical systems, we prefer to reduce the amount of missed detections (FN), even at the cost of a higher rate of FP. For this reason, we selected as reference metric the F-Score (2) , which considers the recall more relevant than the precision: the F-Score(2) for each anomaly checker is computed, and checkers are selected accordingly (choosing the n best, or those whose F-Score(2) > δ).
Experimental Evaluation
We describe the experimental evaluation of the framework. To the purposes of the evaluation, we run an automatic controller that checks input data and manages the communications among the different modules of the Target Machine and Detector Machine. This facilitates the automatic execution of the experimental campaigns without requiring user intervention. All data are available at [20].
Set-up of the Target and the Detector Machine
We conducted an experimental campaign using as target system one of the four virtual machines that host the Secure! crisis management system [8] , which is built on the Liferay [13] portal, and uses Liferay services such as authentication mechanisms, file storage, calendar management. We identified 11 different services that can be invoked by the Secure! users. To simulate a set of possible user actions, we created the All Services workload calling a sequence of services, with a time interval of 1 second and overall lasting approximately 85 seconds (see Table 1 ). Target and Detector Machines are virtual machines that run on a rack server with 3 Intel Xeon E5-2620@ 2.00 GHz processors. The Target Machine runs the Secure! prototype and it is instrumented with the probing system which reads 1 snapshot per second. Following our methodology in Section 3.2, after defining the expected workload we execute tests to collect services information. In Table 1 we compute the time required to obtain services information: we report the time needed to test a single service and all the 11 services (All Tests). The execution of these tests forces the users to wait until the SOA is available again. When the SOA has to be deployed for its first time, this only implies that the deploy is delayed to wait for the tests completion. Once the SOA is deployed and available to users, it is expected that only few services will be updated each time, requiring only specific tests and consequently only short periods of unavailability.
Regarding the most relevant anomaly checkers, we set n = 20, meaning that the 20 best anomaly checkers are selected following the F-Score(2) metric. Finally, we set alpha = 50%, meaning that an alert is raised if at least half of the anomaly checkers detect an anomaly for the considered snapshot. We inject the following errors: i) a memory consumption error (filling a Java LinkedList), and ii) a wrong network usage (fetching HTML text data from an external web page). We executed 60 preliminary runs in which we inject the memory consumption error and other 60 in which we inject the network error in our services. The validation experiments are organized as follows: in 40 runs we inject the memory error, while in the other 40 runs the network error is injected, considering different Liferay services involved by the workload as injection points. Regarding the probing system, we initially observe 55 indicators [6] , [22] from three different layers: 23 from the CentOS operating system, 25 from the middleware (the JVM) and 7 from the Network. As explained in Section 3.3 we select the 20 most performing anomaly checkers (and consequently, the most relevant indicators) out of a set of 221 different options.
Experiments description
Discussion of the results
We show the results of the anomaly detection framework. We first comment on the indicators and the anomaly checkers: in Table 2 and 3 we can observe the most performing anomaly checkers for each of the two error injections. Intuitively, the memory error injection can be detected observing indicators related to Cpu and Java memory; indeed, this can be verified considering the first three checkers selected in the training phase (Table 2) . Similarly, concerning the network error, we expect to observe anomalies in the network layer (see Tcp_Listen in Table 3 ) or in the OS structures that process the incoming data flow (e.g., Buffers in Table 3 ). In line iv) of Table 4 we show the results for the anomaly detection module: it behaves far better than the single anomaly checkers, because it uses a set of them. Moreover, despite the scores of the checkers are on average better for the experiments with network error, the detection capabilities of the framework are worse compared to the experiments with memory consumption injection. It follows that combining "better" anomaly checkers does not always lead to better scores for our anomaly detector. This efficiency strongly depends on the synergy between checkers: if a checker is not able to detect an error and another one is, this can fix the missed detection giving the framework the ability to answer correctly.
In the experiments considered as validation set we obtained anomaly alerts in 95.8% of the runs when the memory error is injected: the missed detections are the It should be noted that with this configuration the framework provides an anomaly evaluation of the observed snapshot in 32.10 ± 5.99 milliseconds. This is the time needed by our framework to process each snapshot coming from the Target Machine.
Precision and Recall varying modules.
We comment on the performances of the anomaly detector varying the modules and the anomaly checkers. From the top of Table 4 we summarize precision, recall and F-Scores obtained i) using the framework in [6] , ii) introducing the network layer, iii) including the diff data series in addition to the default (value) for each indicator and iv) considering services information in combination with context awareness. Table 4 shows how using context awareness significantly raises the F-Score. Furthermore, as expected, introducing network probes significantly improves the F-Score in experiments with network errors.
Other framework configurations can be selected bringing to a higher balance between precision and recall. For example, considering F-Measure instead of F-Score (2) as reference metric we obtain a different set of anomaly checkers, ultimately resulting in precision of 41,0% and 80.2%, with recall of 58,3% and 73,3% respectively for the experiments with memory and network error injection.
State of the art and comparison with other solutions
Anomaly detectors have been proposed as error detectors [10] or failure predictors [2] , based on the hypothesis that the activation of a fault (for error detection) or an error (for failure prediction) manifests as increasingly unstable performance-related behavior before escalating into a failure. The anomaly detector is in charge to observe these fluctuations providing a response to the administrator as soon as it can, triggering proactive recovery or dumping critical data. Reviewing state of the art it is possible to notice that the most used layers are the network [2] , [3] and the operating system [6] , [11] . This is not surprising since most of the systems include these layers: building solutions which fetch data from these layers allow building frameworks that fit in a very wide range of contexts. Regarding context-awareness, as highlighted in [16] , in service-oriented architectures it usually refers to knowledge of the user environment to improve the performances of web services. For example, the Akogrimo project [17] aims at supporting mobile users to access data, knowledge, and computational services on the Grid focusing on user-context (such as user location and environmental information). In our work we refer to a server-side context-awareness, meaning that we do not require user information taking into account only runtime information about the services that are running in the SOA. A detailed overview of anomaly detection frameworks can be found in [1] . Here we focus on three anomaly detection frameworks [2] , [3] , [14] addressing error detection/failure prediction where the authors reported the measurements for detection accuracy metrics (i.e., precision and recall). They observe indicators from multiple layers as the framework presented here does. We remark that these studies are exercised on systems with low dynamicity. Tiresias [3] predicts crash failures trough the observation of network, OS and application metrics by applying an anomaly detection strategy that is instantiated on each different monitored parameter. In CASPER [2] , instead, the authors use different detection modules based on symptoms aggregated trough Complex Event Processing (CEP) techniques based on the non-intrusive observation of network traffic parameters. Lastly, in [14] the authors aimed to detect anomalies due to the manifestation of hang, crash and content failure errors in an ATM system looking at OS indicators, exercising the framework both on Windows and Linux kernels.
In Table 5 we reported the anomaly detection performance extracted from the surveyed studies. Detection performances (we show precision, recall and F-Score(2)) are strongly influenced by the characteristics of the target system: with low dynamicity it is easier to define a normal behaviour, resulting in a significantly lower number of false detections (see [14] , [2] and [3] in Table 5 ). Finally, looking at the performances of our framework we achieved a recall index that is competitive considering highly dynamic systems. Precision is low, meaning many false positives are generated, but in our setting we favoured recall since our aim is to minimize missed detections.
Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper we presented an anomaly detection framework for dynamic systems and especially SOAs. Assuming knowledge of the services that are running at time t on the observed machine gave us the opportunity to consider additional information that resulted fundamental to improve our anomaly detection capabilities.
As future works a sensitivity analysis directed to find the best alpha setup, a larger error model comprising Liferay software bugs, and an estimation of detection time varying number and type of observed layers will be investigated, along with strategies to reduce false positives. To further explore our context, we will focus on how changes in the user workload -and not in the services -can influence our detection capabilities and which strategies can be applied to maintain our solution working effectively.
Lastly, analysis aimed to understand the applicability of this solution when multi- ple SOA services are called simultaneously by different users will be investigated.
